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NOTE
TAKINGS IN THE COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS: DOES
THE COURT MAKE TAKINGS POLICY IN HAGE?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the eleven western states, almost half of the land is feder-
ally owned and a large percentage of that federal land is used
for grazing privately-owned domestic livestock.' The Depart-
ment of the Interior estimates that permitted grazing occurs on
thirty-six percent of federal land, but this percentage is much
higher in the areas containing more federal rangeland.2 In
1990, the eleven western states had approximately seventeen
million beef cattle and 102,800 beef producers.3 Roughly eigh-
teen percent of those beef producers had federal grazing per-
mits, but in some states that percentage was much higher.4
For example, eighty-eight percent of the cattle in Idaho graze
for at least part of the year on federal lands.5
Livestock grazing programs are managed by either the Unit-
ed States Forest Service or the United States Bureau of Land
1. See 2 SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, THE IMPACT OF
FEDERAL PROGRAMS ON WETLANDS 220 (1994) [hereinafter FEDERAL PROGRAMS]. Forty-
eight percent of the land in the 11 western states (including Washington, Oregon,
California, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Da-
kota, and Wyoming, but excluding western North Dakota) is federally owned and
approximately 75 percent of that federal land is grazed by domestic livestock. Id.
2. See id. The excluded areas are those in which federal rangeland is scarce,
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Management ("BLM"), depending on the location.6 In Idaho,
New Mexico, and Nevada, "eighty percent of the permitted
cattle graze on BLM lands and twenty percent on Forest Ser-
vice lands."7 For ranchers in these dry states, a grazing permit
from one of these federal agencies can mean the difference
between a profitable ranch and a non-existent ranch.'
Wayne and Jean Hage own a ranch in Nevada that had
depended for its survival on federal grazing land and water
sources running within federal forest land.' In order to graze
cattle on federal lands legally, the Hages had grazing permits
from the Forest Service that determined how many and what
kind of livestock the Hages could graze, as well as when and
where."0 When those permits were modified and the grazing
allowances significantly decreased in the late 1980s and early
1990s, the Hages found that they were unable to properly man-
age their ranch and its cattle herds." Claiming a taking in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, the Hages brought suit
against the federal government in 1991.'
In March 1996, the United States Court of Federal Claims
issued a preliminary opinion in the Hages' case." Although
6. See id. The two agencies together administer 87 percent of the government's
rangeland. See id.
7. See id.; see also Joseph M. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Manage-
ment of Livestock Grazing on the Public Lands?, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 555, 558
(1993/1994) ("The BLM ... is the largest land manager, public or private, in the
United States."). Feller points out that the BLM manages over two-thirds of the state
of Nevada and that "[g]razing by domestic livestock, primarily cattle, is permitted on
over 90 percent of the land under the BLM's jurisdiction." Id. at 560.
8. See David Abelson, Comment, Water Rights and Grazing Permits: Transform-
ing Public Lands Into Private Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 407, 408 (1994) ("Due to
the aridity of the West, ranchers must have access to vast areas of rangeland in
order to provide enough forage for their livestock.").
9. See Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 153 (1996) ("Without access to
water located in the Toiyabe National Forest, the ranch cannot successfully operate.").
Hage is a prominent figure in the Wise Use Movement, whose proponents claim that
grazing rights are property rights. See Abelson, supra note 8, at 409-10. Hage is also
tied with the "Stewards of the Range," which is the legal arm of the ranchers' resis-
tance. See James Ridgeway & Jeffrey St. Clair, On The Range, LAS VEGAS REv.-J.,
July 16, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 5796579.
10. See Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 153.
11. See id. at 177.
12. See id. at 156. The Hages are suing for $28.4 million. See Ridgeway & St.
Clair, supra note 9, at *5.
13. See Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 147.
1184
TAKINGS IN THE COURT
this story is not yet over, a review of the court's preliminary
opinion will lead to a clearer understanding of its potential
outcome and the court's role in takings litigation. This article
explores Fifth Amendment takings law from the perspective of
the Court of Federal Claims, as presented in part in the Hage
case. Part II briefly reviews Fifth Amendment takings juris-
prudence and the elements needed to prove a takings claim.
Part III explores the recent Hage decision and its potential
outcome in the Court of Federal Claims. Part IV discusses the
court's justification for its recent takings opinions favoring pri-
vate property owners and the policymaking action of courts
versus legislatures in the takings arena. Part IV also refers to
the Hage case and concludes that the Court of Federal Claims
is not poised to set significant precedent, nor to effect general
takings policy, with the Hage case. In addition, the Hages are
unlikely to recover a significant amount, if anything, for the
alleged taking of their property. Part V concludes that takings
policy will continue to evolve with input from both the judiciary
and the legislature.
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
federal government from taking private property for public use
without just compensation.' 4 A taking can arise when a gov-
ernment action results in the physical occupation of private
property,15 or when a governmental regulation of private prop-
erty "goes too far."6 When a regulatory taking is alleged, the
court must first determine whether there is a complete depriva-
tion of the economically beneficial use of the property. 7 The
government has "gone too far" and taken private property when
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment prohibition against uncom-
pensated takings also applies to the states through its incorporation into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1;
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
15. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987); Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
16. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
17. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987)
("We have held that land use regulation can effect a taking if it 'does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable
use of his land.') (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
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a regulation denies an owner all economically beneficial use of
his property. 8 However, a regulation that results in less than
a complete deprivation need only promote and substantially ad-
vance a legitimate governmental interest to withstand a takings
claim.'9
The Hages have alleged a regulatory taking of their grazing
and water rights, but they must first establish that they actual-
ly own a property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment
before the Court of Federal Claims will determine whether a
taking has actually occurred. ° Although many westerners use
public land in a manner that does not result in, or arise from,
a private property right,2' the Hages believe that a vested
property right may be established by a rancher's traditional use
of public lands.22 Underlying the Hages' case is the fact that
historical grazing policy is at odds with present environmental
policy." Policy, however, is not an issue in the Hages' case;24
whether compensatory property rights have been taken is. On
one side, Wayne Hage "seeks to intertwine his use of federal
lands with his constitutionally protected water right, hoping to
18. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495.
19. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132-38 (1978). For
instance, the use of private property may be limited without a taking by zoning re-
strictions and the prevention of a nuisance. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
20. See Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 151 ("In the concrete taking case the court must
initially decide if the plaintiff has an actual property interest, if this is a point of
dispute. This determination is based upon long and venerable case precedent, devel-
oped over the last two centuries."); see also Theodore Blank, Comment, Grazing
Rights on Public Lands: Wayne Hage Complains of a Taking, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 603,
608 (1993/1994) ("This inquiry, into the nature and extent of the governmental action,
becomes necessary only after the complainant has successfully established ownership
of an interest that qualifies as property under the Fifth Amendment.").
21. See Blank, supra note 20, at 608 n.27 (citing 1 GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROB-
ERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 3.04(3)(c)(i) (1993) ("Many
interests created by federal law, such as grazing leases, do not amount to true prop-
erty rights.")).
22. See id. at 610.
23. See generally Feller, supra note 7, at 556-57 ("Historically, these lands have
been managed primarily for the benefit of livestock ranchers, with environmental
protection and alternative uses relegated to a secondary role at best. Over the last
two decades, new Congressional mandates have called on the BLM to serve a broader
constituency and to ensure protection of environmental resources such as wildlife,
water quality, and natural scenery.").
24. See infra part IV.
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force the conclusion that a regulatory interference with live-
stock grazing 'takes' both a grazing right and his water
right."25 In response, the government maintains that a grazing
permit is merely a license to graze, and therefore any govern-
mental regulation of grazing practices does not invoke any Fifth
Amendment taking concerns.
III. THE HAGE CASE
A. The Pine Creek Ranch and the Hages' Federal Grazing
Permit
The Pine Creek Ranch in central Nevada has been used for
cattle ranching since its creation in 1865.26 The ranch is ap-
proximately 7000 acres in size, but ranch owners have always
had to rely upon the use of additional government-owned range-
land for grazing their cattle and ditch rights-of-way through
federal land for access to water supplies." The first grazing
permit was issued to the owners of Pine Creek Ranch in 1907
based upon their prior use of the range.28
Wayne and Jean Hage purchased the Pine Creek Ranch and
received their first grazing permit from the United States For-
est Service in 1978.29 This permit allowed the Hages to graze
their cattle within six allotments of the Toiyabe National Forest
during specified times of the year." However, that permit and
those that followed contained specific provisions that allowed
the federal government to suspend, revoke or amend the permit
for a variety of reasons.3 For example, part 2, section 8 of the
25. Blank, supra note 20, at 610.
26. See Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 153.
27. See id. "Plaintiffs use ditch rights-of-way, which are easements on federal
lands, to transport water for irrigation, stock watering and domestic purposes." Id.
The Hages use 512,000 acres of BLM rangeland and 240,000 acres of the Toiyabe
National Forest for cattle grazing. Blank, supra note 20, at 609.
28. See Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 153.
29. See id.
30. See id. "[T]he permit also contained terms unique to plaintiffs ... [including]
number, kind and class of livestock permitted to graze, and the period of such use."
Id.
31. See id. Federal regulations also state the reasons for which a grazing prefer-
ence and permit may be cancelled, modified or suspended. See 36 C.F.R. § 222.4
(1995) (Forest Service regulation regarding grazing permits); 36 C.F.R. §§ 4140.1,
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1978 permit stated that the government could terminate the
grazing permit "whenever the area described in this permit is
needed by the Government for some other form or use."32
Moreover, the 1984 permit also required the Hages to meet
certain use conditions in order to retain their permit."
The Hages' conflicts with the Forest Service began almost as
soon as they bought their ranch. In 1979, the Forest Service
granted permission to the Nevada Department of Wildlife
("NDOW") to release elk for hunting into the Hages' Table
Mountain allotment area of the Toiyabe National Forest.' The
Hages complained to the state about the elk, arguing that the
elk drank their water, ate their forage, and "impeded the graz-
ing and movement of their livestock." 5 The state responded by
stating that elk hunting and cattle grazing "appear to be rea-
sonably compatible," and therefore the Hages would need to
share their use of the public rangelands with the hunters."
Meanwhile in 1980, the Forest Service also began to divert the
flow of water in springs claimed by the Hages in their Meadow
4170.1-1 to -2 (1995) (BLM regulations regarding grazing permits). In general, a valid
grazing permit may be cancelled, modified or suspended if the permittee violates the
terms or conditions in his permit, federal regulations, or state or federal law, or if
the forage resource has been damaged or destroyed. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 222.4, 4140.1,
4170.1-1, 4170.1-2 (1995); see also Frank J. Falen & Karen Budd-Falen, The Right to
Graze Livestock on the Federal Lands: The Historical Development of Western Grazing
Rights, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 505, 508 (1993/1994) (discussing the acquisition and poten-
tial loss of a federal grazing preference).
32. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 153. The government could also change any of the
permit's terms when necessary for resource protection. See id. The Hages' revised
1984 permit added more restrictions: "[tihis permit may be modified at any time
during the term to conform with needed changes brought about by law, regulations,
executive orders, allotment management plans, land management planning, numbers
permitted or season of use necessary because of resource condition or other manage-
ment needs." Id.
33. See id. For example, the Hages "were responsible for additional maintenance
and structural improvements on the federal lands .... [and] were required to graze
at least 90% of the permitted number of cattle or risk termination of their permit for
'non-use.'" Id. at 153-54.
34. See id. at 154.
35. Id.
36. Id. Grazing permits are generally subject to multiple use management of pub-
lic lands requirements under the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r
(1994), the Federal Land Policy & Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702(c), (k)
(1994), the Public Range Lands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901(b)(2),
1902(d), (), 1903(b) (1994), and various federal regulations.
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Canyon allotment." The Hages responded by filing a request
with the State Engineer to initiate water rights adjudication in
1981.3"
By the late 1980s, the Forest Service had threatened to modi-
fy, suspend or cancel the Hages' grazing permits in these two
allotments in response to alleged permit violations and serious
range deterioration. 39 After the Forest Service cancelled 25% of
the Table Mountai allotment grazing permit and suspended
20% of the same for two years,40 cancelled 38% of the Meadow
Canyon allotment and suspended 100% of the same for five
years,41 and impounded and sold a number of cattle, the Hages
decided to sue.
B. Wayne Hage Gets His First Day in Court
In 1991, Wayne and Jean Hage brought suit against the
United States claiming that the federal government, through
the actions of the Forest Service, had taken their grazing and
water rights.42 In their complaint, the Hages sought recovery
based on three theories. First, they claimed "that the grazing
permit create[d] a binding contract between the parties which
[the] defendant ha[d] breached," thus entitling them to damag-
es.' Second, they claimed that the government took their
property without just compensation." Third, they claimed that
they were entitled to compensation for improvements construct-
37. See Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 155.
38. See id. This adjudication, which began in 1991, was still in progress in 1996.
See id. at 155 n.4.
39. See id. at 154-55. In 1988, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO)
reported "that 20 percent of BLM and Forest Service allotments were being
overgrazed and that for 75 percent of these areas, the rangeland managers had
scheduled no change in grazing practices." FEDERAL PROGRAMS, supra note 1, at 221.
See generally Feller, supra note 7, at 560-62 (describing the environmental impacts of
livestock grazing which can cause severe deterioration).
40. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 154.
41. See id. at 155.
42. See id. at 156. The Hages complained that the government had taken "com-
pensable property rights in their grazing permit, water rights, ditch rights-of-way,
forage on the rangeland, cattle and ranch ... through physical and regulatory ac-
tions." Id.; see also Blank, supra note 20, at 609-10.
43. Hage, 35 Fed. C1. at 156, 165-67.
44. See id. at 156, 167-78.
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ed in the Toiyabe National Forest.4" In response, the govern-
ment sought summary judgment on each theory.
In March 1996, the United States Court of Federal Claims
issued a preliminary opinion granting summary judgment to the
government on the Hages' grazing permit claim only.46 Holding
that the Hages' grazing permit was merely a license to graze
cattle, the court stated that the privilege to graze does not
create a property right deserving of Fifth Amendment protec-
tion.47 In regard to the Hages' other claims, however, the court
denied summary judgment and concluded that the mixed ques-
tions of law and fact regarding the Hages' alleged property
interests needed to be addressed at a limited evidentiary hear-
ing.48 A takings analysis will be conducted only if, at such a
hearing, the court determines that the Hages actually own
property rights in the claimed water, ditch rights-of-way and
forage.49
1. A Federal Grazing Permit is Merely a License to Graze"
On the Hages' first theory, the court found that the grazing
permit did not create a contract between the parties as a mat-
ter of law.5 The court agreed with the government's argument
that a grazing permit does not create contractual rights because
"the language and characteristics of the agreement are that of a
license," and because "the Forest Service, as an agent for the
federal government, did not have the authority to contractually
bind the government."5 Instead of creating contractual rights,
45. See id. at 156, 178-180.
46. See id. at 147.
47. See id. at 171.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 178.
50. Although contractual rights, not property rights, were at issue in regards to
the Hages' grazing permit, the court's holding is important to the general discussion
because the Hages tried to intertwine their water and property rights with their
grazing privilege. See infra notes 59, 73, 78-79 and accompanying text.
51. See Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 166.
52. Id. at 166. The claims court points out that "[all the courts which have con-
sidered this issue have held or assumed such agreements to be licenses which confer
certain privileges to the permittee, revokable at the government's discretion. Id. at
167; see also Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890) ("We are of the opinion that
there is an implied license, growing out of the custom of nearly a hundred years,
1190
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the permit "merely granted plaintiffs certain exclusive privileges
based upon historical grazing practices.""
Those historical grazing practices, however, are the backbone
of the Hages' property rights argument. Wayne Hage acknowl-
edges that his grazing permit does not create a grazing right
protected by the Fifth Amendment; however, he does assert
that he owns a property interest that vested prior to the cre-
ation of the permit system and the federal agencies that ad-
minister that system.54 In his book, Storm Over Rangelands:
Private Rights in Federal Lands, Hage argues that the permit
"is only an acknowledgement of a prior existing private proper-
ty right, created by the conjunction of two federal actions."5
Those two federal actions consist of the government's severance
of water rights from rights to the underlying public land," and
"the federal government's acquiescence in the grazing of live-
stock on public lands."" Hage asserts that these two federal
actions together created a "property interest in the beneficial
use of his state perfected water right."58 Moreover, Hage ar-
gues, his constitutionally protected water right combined with
his grazing preference create a compensable property interest
that the public lands of the United States . . .shall be free to the people who seek
to use them where they are left open and unenclosed, and no act of government
forbids this use.").
53. Hage, 35 Fed. C1. at 166. "[A] license creates a personal or revokable privilege
allowing a specific party to utilize the land of another for a specific purpose but does
not vest any title or interest in such property in the licensee." Id. Under the federal
land management statute, permits and leases for domestic livestock grazing on public
lands are issued for ten-year periods. See 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a) (1994).
54. See Blank, supra note 20, at 611. Public lands were divided into specific graz-
ing districts by the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, which also required the issuance of
exclusive permits for grazing privileges. See Pub. L. No. 34-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (codi-
fied as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1994)). See also Falen & Budd-Falen,
supra note 31, at 507 ("[A] [grazing] preference is not, nor can it be, 'created' by the
BLM or Forest Service. Rather during the grazing adjudication process, which usually
occurred when the federal lands were withdrawn from settlement, preferences were
awarded to those live operators who met certain qualifications.").
55. Blank, supra note 20, at 610 (citing WAYNE HAGE, STORM OVER RANGELANDS:
PRIVATE RIGHTS IN FEDERAL LANDS 161-64, 181-87 (1989)).
56. See id- '[Bly statute, the federal government authorized the creation of rights
to water on public lands in individuals who complied with state law." Id.
57. Id. The federal government did not only acquiesce, but actually encouraged,
such grazing during the time of western settlement and acquisition. See Falen &
Budd-Falen, supra note 31, at 511-22.
58. Blank, supra note 20, at 610.
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that the government has hindered through regulatory and ad-
ministrative actions. 9
The claims court did not agree. Instead, the court determined
that the grazing permit "never created a property interest but
rather a preference to use the allotment before the government
gave the right to another."" In so finding, the court referred
to Wyoming v. Colorado,6 in which the Supreme Court held
that a private party "who makes beneficial use of the public
lands has a greater priority to the use of the land than another
private party who did not."62 The person with priority, how-
ever, does not have a compensable property interest in the
federal lands.63 The court also pointed out that the Act of
1866, which did recognize vested rights in water and ditch
rights-of-way through federal lands under state law, did not
address private property rights in the public lands.'
As for the Hages' investment-backed expectations and their
essential need for grazing rights, the court acknowledged that
"[tihe permit obviously adds value to plaintiffs' ranch and plain-
tiffs may have expected the option to renew the permit indefi-
nitely."65 Moreover, the court pointed out that the Hages'
ranch may become worthless without a grazing permit.66 Nev-
ertheless, the court stressed "that [the] plaintiffs' investment-
backed expectations and reliance on the privilege to graze do
not, in themselves, create a property interest in the rangeland
or the permit.""7 In addition, the court noted that it had previ-
ously found no right to the value that permitted grazing lands
59. See id. at 610-11.
60. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 170. "In other words, a preference grants a party the
right of first refusal, not a property right in the underlying land." Id.
61. 259 U.S. 419 (1922), modified at 353 U.S. 953 (1957).
62. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 170.
63. See id.
64. See id. Moreover, the court stated that it "declines to create such rights con-
trary to the clear legislative intention of Congress." Id.; see also Blank, supra note
20, at 612-22 (discussing the acts passed and cases decided regarding the creation of
water and grazing rights).
65. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 171.
66. See id.
67. Id.; see also Blank, supra note 20, at 609 ("Hage insists that without grazing
access, his water right has ceased to be economically viable and his reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations have been defeated, resulting in a taking of his proper-
ty without just compensation.").
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contribute to a ranch." In White Sands Ranchers v. United
States, for example, the Court of Federal Claims declared that
"[i]t is settled law that grazing permits, though they are of
much value to ranchers in the operation of an integrated ranch-
ing unit, nevertheless do not constitute property for purposes of
the just compensation clause."6 9
2. The Hages' Potential Property Rights in Water, Ditch
Rights-of-Way, Forage, and Cattle
On the Hages' second theory of recovery, the court held that
the plaintiffs had presented enough evidence to show potential
ownership of certain water rights, ditch rights-of-way, and for-
age, and thus denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgement."0 First, the court emphasized that "the right to ap-
propriate water can be a property right,"7 and that both the
legislature in the Act of 1866 and the Supreme Court in nu-
merous cases have clearly acknowledged that private parties
68. See Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 169, 171.
69. White Sands Ranchers v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 559, 566 (1973). With sup-
port from the Supreme Court in United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973), the
claims court concluded by stating that "[iut has also been held that even as the graz-
ing permits may not be assigned any compensable value in their own right, so nei-
ther may the market value which they contribute to private fee lands be recognized.
in the just compensation due upon the taking of the private lands." 14 Cl. Ct. at 567;
see also Fuller, 409 U.S. at 494 ("The provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act ... make
clear the congressional intent that no compensable property right be created in the
permit lands themselves as a result of the issuance of the permit. Given that intent,
it would be unusual, we think, for Congress to have turned around and authorized
compensation for the value added to feed lands by their potential use in connection
with permit lands.").
70. See Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 171. The defendant initially argued that the court
did not have jurisdiction to hear the Hages' Fifth Amendment water-rights taking
claim. See id. at 156-58. The court, however, found that it "has jurisdiction to deter-
mine title to real property as a preliminary matter when addressing a taking claim.
Similarly, this court may determine whether plaintiffs have title to a property inter-
est in water as a preliminary matter before addressing whether that property has
been taken by the government." Id. at 159. The Hages are also currently involved in
litigation with the State of Nevada regarding their water rights in the Monitor Val-
ley. See id. at 160.
71. Id. at 172 (citing Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 460-61 (1922), modified
at 353 U.S. 953 (1957)).
1194 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1183
may acquire vested water rights on public lands.7" Thus the
Hages may have compensable rights in water on federal lands.
Assuming that they have compensable water rights, the
Hages argued that they also have compensable forage rights
that are "linked to their vested water right under the Act of
1866 and state law."73 The Hages asserted that this right vest-
ed prior to 1907, when the federal land in question was first
appropriated by the government.74 Although they will have the
opportunity to prove the existence of such forage property
rights, the Hages' claim appears to be unsupported by both
legislation and case law. 5 First, courts have held that grazing
on federal land is merely a revokable privilege, and not a prop-
erty right in federal rangeland.76 Second, Congress has not
established a property right in forage through any act or regu-
lation."
The government asserts that, "as a matter of law, [the
72. See id. The court quotes the 1866 Act:
Whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for min-
ing, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and ac-
crued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local cus-
toms, laws and decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such
vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the same ...
Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 661). The court also cites two Supreme Court cases: Broder
v. Natoma Water & Mining Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276 (1879), and Central Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Alameda County, Cal., 284 U.S. 463 (1932), for support.
73. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 174. "Plaintiffs claim that the right to use water on the
public lands and the right to graze under Nevada law 'are inextricably intertwined.'"
Id. at 175. The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has never addressed the
scope of the water rights recognized by the Act of 1866. Id. at 175.
74. See id. at 175.
75. See id. at 174-75. Even the claims court says that the "[p]laintiffs present a
novel argument regarding how and why they have vested grazing rights in the
Toiyabe National Forest despite the overwhelming cases finding no such right." Id.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973); Buford v. Houtz, 133
U.S. 320 (1890). See supra notes 53, 60-64 and accompanying text.
77. Both the Act of 1866 and the Act of 1870, which incorporated the 1866 Act,
granted water rights and ditch rights arising under the prior appropriation doctrine,
but neither addressed property rights in federal land. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262,
14 Stat. 251 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 51 (1994) and 43 U.S.C. § 661
(1994)); Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
§ 52 (1994) and 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1994)); see also Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95 (1937)
(reasserting that water rights were severed from federal lands by the Desert Act of
1877); California Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158-62
(1935) (stating that Congress had intended to sever water on public lands from feder-
al ownership with the Desert Act of 1877).
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Hages'] alleged vested water rights do not grant [them] the
right to 'bootstrap' an interest in adjacent federal lands and re-
sources."78  Furthermore, the government emphasizes that
"courts consistently have held that an easement to graze on
public lands does not attach to a water right on public
lands."79 Nevertheless, the court recognized that the federal
government had to acknowledge at least some state-created
private property rights in the public domain when it created
the Toiyabe National Forest." Moreover, compensation would
be required under the Constitution if Congress had removed all
of the state-created private property interests in the public do-
main." The Hages will have an opportunity to prove that they
do in fact have property rights in the forage that stem from
their property right to make beneficial use of the water within
the federal forestland;82 however, the court will conduct a tak-
ing takings analysis only if they prove the existence of such a
property right in forage.
The Hages have also claimed that the Forest Service took
their property when it "imposed unreasonable conditions on
access and maintenance of [their] ditch rights."83 The govern-
ment, however, argues that the Hages' activities exceeded "nor-
mal" maintenance, and thus the Forest Service "acted properly
and reasonably by regulating [the Hages'] actions on the public
lands."" As with their other alleged property rights, the Hages
will need to prove their ownership of vested ditch rights and
"that their desired use and maintenance of these rights does
not exceed the scope of their property interest, requiring a
78. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 174. "Defendant acknowledges that a stockwatering right
is premised on the ability to graze stock and put the water to beneficial use and that
if defendant revokes grazing permit the stockwatering right will be worthless." Id.
79. Id at 174; see also Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
80. See Hage 35 Fed. Cl. at 175.
81. See id. at 175-76. "Just as the federal government could not take private
property rights in water or ditch rights-of-way when it created the Toiyabe National
Forest, the government could not take any other form of private property right in the
public domain." Id. at 176.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 174.
84. Id. at 173. The defendant asserts that federal regulations allow the Forest
Service to regulate and restrict ditch use and activities beyond the scope of normal
maintenance and repair. Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. § 2801.1 (1995)).
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special use permit""s in order to proceed with the takings
claim.
3. The Hages' Other Claims: Compensation for Cattle Taken
and for Improvements Made to Federal Forest Land
The Hages also claimed that they should have been compen-
sated for cattle taken by the Forest Service.8" The cattle had
been found on one allotment after the grazing period had ex-
pired and on another allotment after the Hages' permit for that
area had been suspended. 7 The government argued that the
cattle were thus trespassing on federal lands, and that it could,
as the landowner, confiscate and sell the cattle.88 In addition,
the government emphasized that the Hages were notified of the
impoundment and impending sale of their cattle,89 and, there-
fore, they need not be compensated for "the consequences of
[their] own neglect."90
The Hages alleged that the Forest Service "knowingly created
an environment that made it economically and practically infea-
sible to manage the cattle on the allotments."9' In addition,
they insisted that the Forest Service purposely caused them to
lose their grazing permit and the use of their stockwatering
rights.9' The court denied the defendant's motion for summary
85. Id. at 174.
86. See id. at 176.
87. See id. at 154-55.
88. See id. at 176. Defendant also asserts that "[w]hen cattle are found on federal
lands improperly, the cattle may be seized and sold under 16 U.S.C. § 551 and appli-
cable regulations." Id. Such regulations include 36 C.F.R. § 262.10, (1991) which per-
mits the Forest Service to impound and sell livestock under certain conditions. See id.
89. See id. at 177.
90. Id. (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530 (1982)).
91. Id.
92. See id. The court stated:
Plaintiffs appear to argue that defendant took their cattle by regulation
and by physically inducing the cattle to graze on the Meadow Canyon
allotment during the suspension period. Plaintiffs also argue that defen-
dant created a situation where it was physically and economically impos-
sible to prevent their cattle from wandering and to redeem their cattle
after impoundment.
Id. at 178. Hage also claimed that he watched rangers drive his cattle to off-limits
range in order to set him up. See Jim Carrier, Rebels on the Range; Nevadans Take
on Federal Sovereignty, DENVER POST, Jan. 21, 1996, at Al.
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judgment, but also determined that the Hages must concede
that the government acted properly under the permit in order
to bring a takings claim."
Because the cattle were seized in accordance with the
permit's restrictions and federal regulations, the court stated
that the seizure of the cattle could not constitute a taking. 4
However, the Hages will be given an opportunity to try to
prove their claim that the government's actions that caused
them to violate the permit were actually the taking.95 In other
words, "[t]he seizure of the cattle was the effect of the taking
and its measure of damages." 6 The court is unlikely to agree,
which is apparent from its emphasis on the fact that the Hages
will need to demonstrate that the government's actions con-
stituted a taking "despite the regulations and permit terms and
despite the warnings and opportunities to redeem their
cattle."97
In addition to the compensation sought for their cattle, the
Hages have also sought compensation for the improvements
that they have added to federal property. In conjunction with
this claim, the Hages argue that the Forest Service cancelled
their permit in order to devote their allotments to another
public purpose." Pursuant to federal land management statu-
tory requirements,99 the Hages are entitled to compensation
for the improvements if the government actually did cancel the
permit in order to devote the allotments to another "public
purpose," rather than to simply enforce the Hages' permit
terms, as alleged by the Forest Service.' Moreover, the
93. See Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 178.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. Id. "Under this view, the seizure under the permit is merely the measure of
damages of the taking, it is not the claimed taking." Id.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. See 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) (1994).
100. See Hage, 35 Fed. C1. at 179. According to the Hages' grazing permit:
[P]ermanent improvements constructed, or existing for use, in conjunction
with this permit are the property of the United States Government...
[which] will not be removed, nor compensated for upon cancellation of
this permit ... except in the National Forests in the 11 contiguous
western states when cancelled in whole or in part to devote the land to
another public purpose.
1996 1197
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1183
Hages do not need to prove a taking to receive such compensa-
tion.'°' At the evidentiary hearing, both parties will have the
opportunity to present evidence and testimony regarding own-
ership of these rights and the scope of that ownership.
C. Will the Hages Win Their Case in the Court of Federal
Claims?
The Hages' actual property rights on the public lands have
yet to be decided. Their chances of prevailing appear strongest
in regard to their water rights; however those rights are basi-
cally useless without the adjacent forage and grazing rights. At
first glance, monetary compensation may seem both "fair," par-
ticularly since the Hages cannot run their ranch without either
their water rights or grazing privileges, and necessary, since
the Hages appear to have vested rights in the water. A closer
look at legal precedent and public land-use law, however, may
reveal a different outcome.
10 2
The Court of Federal Claims came to the conclusion that the
Hages might have compensable property rights in water on
federal lands based on congressional intent and state law. °3
Pursuant to the Act of 1866, local law is used to determine
priority of possession in water rights on federal lands.'" In
Nevada, the earliest appropriator of the water has priority over
all other appropriators, including the government."5 There-
fore, the Hages would have a right superior to that of the gov-
ernment to use any amount of water previously appropriated if




102. See Blank, supra note 20, at 625-27 (explaining that the Hages' property had
not been taken because the government had not physically intruded on the water and
the Hages' investment-backed expectations were not reasonable).
103. See Hage, 35 Fed. Ct. at 172.
104. See id. at 172-73.
105. See id. Private individuals can acquire water rights by prior appropriation in
all of the western states. See GEORGE C. COGGINS, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RE-
SOURCE LAW § 365 (3d ed. 1993).
106. See Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 172-73. The court notes that this is "[slubject to
reasonable regulation." See id. at 172.
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Without a grazing right, however, the Hages cannot make a
"beneficial" use of their water, thus rendering their right sub-
ject to forfeiture under Nevada law."' This loss through for-
feiture would not normally constitute a taking; however, the
Hages will have had to forfeit their rights only because of the
government's deliberate actions."0 But the Hages are not
claiming a taking by forced forfeiture. 9 Instead, they claim
that their reasonable investment-backed expectations in their
water rights have been defeated by the government's actions
denying them use of federal lands."0 Assuming that they
could proceed on this argument, the Hages would then need to
prove that their expectations were actually reasonable to win a
takings claim."' The Supreme Court has recently held that a
property owner's expectations are not reasonable when "the pro-
scribed use interests were not part of his title to begin
with."" In the Hages' case, the grazing privilege constitutes
the "proscribed use interest" which was not part of their origi-
nal title. Because the court has already determined that a graz-
ing privilege is not a property right,"' any expectation in wa-
ter use dependant on the ability to graze on federal lands
would not be reasonable." Moreover, the court's recent tak-
ings decisions often reflect that "those who buy property subject
to a preexisting regulatory scheme will have great difficulty
showing that a later regulatory action went so far beyond that
which a reasonable owner would have anticipated as to effect a
taking of their property.""' 5
Although the Hages' future expectations in the use of their
107. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.060 (1995). Note that the use of water within
national forests is subject to regulation under 16 U.S.C. § 481 (1994). See Hage, 35
Fed. Cl. at 172.
108. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
109. Nor does the court address this possibility.
110. See Blank, supra note 20, at 625-26.
111. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Where a taking is alleged from regulations which deprive
the property of all value, the test must be whether the deprivation is contrary to
reasonable, investment-backed expectations."); Blank, supra note 20, at 626-27.
112. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
113. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
114. See Blank, supra note 20, at 627.
115. George W. Miller & Jonathan L. Abram, A Survey of Recent Takings Cases in
the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 42
CATH. U. L. REV. 863, 863-64 (1993).
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water may be unreasonable, the court is likely to find that the
Hages did in fact have a vested compensable property right in
their water located on federal lands when the elk were released
with the permission of the Forest Service. In Kaiser-Aetna v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that "the 'right to ex-
clude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the
property right, falls within this category of interests that the
Government cannot take without compensation."" 6 Following
the holding in that case, the Hages had at least a right to ex-
clude the non-indigenous elk from using their water, and there-
fore, they should at least receive compensation for the water
used by the elk."'
IV. TAKINGS TODAY: DOES THE COURT MAKE PUBLIC POLICY?.
"Takings cases are invariably tough cases pitting strongly held
values, about significant public concerns, against other strongly
held values and interests."""
A. The Court's Role in Takings Jurisprudence
The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction
over any claim brought by a citizen against the federal govern-
ment that is founded upon a Constitutional provision, a con-
gressional act or executive regulation, a government contract, or
a monetary claim in a case not sounding in tort."9 Takings
litigation accounts for at least one-fifth of the court's docket.2
In the past decade, the Court of Federal Claims has estab-
lished itself as a major force in the development of takings
jurisprudence. 2' Its numerous decisions favoring private prop-
116. 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (citations omitted); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704, 716 (1987) ("[Olne of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property-[is] the right to exclude others.").
117. But cf. Fallini v. United States, 31 Fed. C1. 53 (1994) (holding that ranchers
did not suffer a compensable taking when water produced in excess of their total
preference was consumed by wild horses allowed to graze on their allotment).
118. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 151.
119. See The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
120. Takings cases for more than $10,000 must be brought in the Court of Federal
Claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1491(a) (1994).
121. See generally Miller & Abram, supra note 115.
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erty owners," however, have garnered criticism from environ-
mentalists and a variety of comments both pro and con from le-
gal scholars.' One commentator, for example, asserts that
the court's Loveladies Harbor decision "appears to ignore the
Nation's sentiment to preserve and protect our environ-
ment."' Furthermore, he states that "[tihe Loveladies Harbor
decision is a takings decision which skirts important issues in
favor of clinging inflexibly to concepts of a generic takings
analysis."' Another author attacks the Supreme Court as
well, stating that it "has legitimized the concept of regulatory
takings as a judicial check on land use and environmental regu-
lation."12
6
The Hage opinion is particularly interesting because Chief
Judge Loren A. Smith begins his opinion with a summary of
takings jurisprudence and, in response to the criticism, a clear
defense of the court's more recent stance in takings litigation.
Judge Smith begins by acknowledging that some consider the
court in a takings case to be a "defender against regulatory
excess," while others believe that the court should be "an activ-
ist advocate for certain policy positions." 7 Judge Smith as-
serts, however, that both of these views "misconstrue the role of
122. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990);
Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989); Florida Rock Indus. v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985).
123. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian
Property, Natural Law, and The Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25
ENVTL. L. 171, (1995); Roger J. Marzulla & Nancie G. Marzu~la, Regulatory Takings
In The United States Claims Court: Adjusting The Burdens That In Fairness And
Equity Ought To Be Borne By Society As A Whole, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 549 (1991);
Timothy G. Warner, Recent Decisions by the United States Claims Court and the Need
for Greater Supreme Court Direction in Wetlands Taking Cases, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV.
901 (1992); Patrick Kennedy, Comment, The United States Claims Court: A Safe
"Harbor" From Government Regulation of Privately Owned Wetlands, 9 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 723 (1992).
124. Kennedy, supra note 123, at 735. Kennedy also asserts that Loveladies Harbor
"should serve as an example of why more concrete and specific rules regarding tak-
ings issues should be formulated." Id.
125. Id. at 744. The author goes on to say that "[elach issue in Loveladies Harbor
was supported by case law favoring the government's position. However, the court
went out of its way to avoid these cases and the arguments they espoused." Id. But
see Marzulla & Marzulla, supra note 118, at 555 (IIT]he Claims Court has rarely
shirked its duty to wrestle to the heart of a fact pattern and to tailor an appropriate
result.").
126. Blumm, supra note 123, at 171.
127. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 150.
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the judge" in the takings arena."' He states:
In taking claims the judge does not sit as super legislator
or executive, intent on preventing regulation that "goes too
far," .... The job of the court is to deal with a concrete
claim, by an aggrieved person or persons, that their consti-
tutional rights under the Fifth Amendment have been vio-
lated by some governmental action. The court must proceed
to analyze this claim, as any other legal claim, regardless of
the consequences to governmental policy. Unless property
right claims are to be given lesser due process than other
claimed constitutional violations, the court must interpret
the words of the constitutional protection as it would any
other language conferring rights .... The tools and skills of
legal analysis have little to do with public policy, and much
to do with the integrity of the rule of law."9
In other words, the court must act only as a "judicial decision-
maker bound by constitutional language and precedent," and
not as a policymaker."' Policymaking is left to the legislature
and the executive, as intended by the Framers of the Constitu-
tion.
131
1. The Court as a Policymaker
In Hage, Judge Smith asserts that policymaking in the tak-
ings arena should be left to the legislature. However, the
court's inherent policy, which derives from the Fifth Amend-
ment, is to protect private property rights from governmental
128. Id.
129. Id. at 150-51. The court also states:
When a court finds a statute, a regulation, or a governmental
action to be a "taking" requiring compensation, it is not saying the gov-
ernment went "too far." . . . Rather, the court is finding that the govern-
ment has, as a factual matter, deprived an actual property owner of
some part of a legally recognized property interest. . . . Courts have
found the "too far" language taken by itself not to be very helpful in




131. See id. ("The genius of our Framer's tripartite division of constitutional power
is the creation of separated institutions that each best deal with different categories
of governmental decisions.").
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takings.'32 This idea of protecting private property is a policy
created by the judiciary, since the Fifth Amendment does not
actually prohibit the government from taking private property.
Instead, the Takings Clause merely states that just compensa-
tion must be paid when private property is taken by the gov-
ernment.'33
Judge Smith is correct to the extent that the court is not
supposed to be a policymaker; however, certain judicial policy
decisions have been made more recently in the takings arena
that have contributed to the formation of public policy in favor
of the private property owner. Furthermore, takings jurispru-
dence is actually defined in part by policy decisions made by
judges past and present." 4 For example, courts have been in-
strumental in developing regulatory takings policy since the
Supreme Court created the concept in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon."' In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court stated for the first
132. In his introduction to a book on regulatory takings, Judge Smith wrote that
"the very purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the citizen against the govern-
ment, specifically the federal government." Chief Judge Loren A. Smith, Introduction
to ROGER CLEGG ET AL., REGULATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
2 (1994). The dictionary defines "policy" as "a definite course of action adopted for the
sake of expediency, facility, etc.," and "a course of action adopted and pursued by a
government, rules, political party, etc.," and "action of procedure conforming to or
considered with reference to prudence or expediency." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 1497 (2d ed. 1993).
133. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
reads: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."
Id. (emphasis added). See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) ("[T]he [Fifth] amendment . . . is designed not
to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to se-
cure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a tak-
ing. . . ."); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 (1985)
("[S]o long as compensation is available for those whose property is in fact taken, the
governmental action is not unconstitutional."); see also Erika Jones et al., The Fifth
Amendments Just Compensation Clause: Implications for Regulatory Policy, 6 ADMIN.
L.J. 674, 675 (1993) (stating that it is a well-settled principle that the government
can take one's property, as long as it pays for it); Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Issues
in Light of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Decision Full of Sound and
Fury Signifying Nothing, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 440 (1993) (stating that the Tak-
ings Clause "only requires that just compensation be available through the courts
where such a taking is found to have occurred.").
134. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 167 (1921) (McKenna, J., dissenting)
(stating that the court must often draw the line that separates the legal from the
illegal operation of the police power. When the court draws that line, it is arguably
creating policy.)
135. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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time that a regulation that "goes too far," but does not result in
an actual physical invasion, will be recognized as a taking."6
Prior to Pennsylvania Coal, a taking occurred only when the
government physically occupied private property.1 7 What Jus-
tice Holmes meant when he wrote "goes too far" has been left
to the courts to decide. 3' In deciding this question over the
years, the courts have created takings policy by creating the
different tests used to find a regulatory taking."9
Another example of court-made policy is evident in the more
recent wetlands cases. In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, the Court of Federal Claims held for the first time that
the Army Corps of Engineers' denial of a section 404 dredge-
136. Id. at 415. The majority held that the statute preventing mining in order to
prevent subsidence of surface property was invalid because it took private property
without just compensation. See id. at 415-16. Justice Brandeis dissented, stating that
the restriction in question was "merely the prohibition of a noxious use," and that a
regulation preventing a public harm was a valid exercise of the police power which
did not constitute a taking. Id. at 417.
137. A literal reading of the Fifth Amendment shows that it only requires compen-
sation to be paid when the federal government takes private property, but not when
it regulates private property. See William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of
the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995); cf.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) ("It is to be remembered that we
are dealing with one of the most essential powers of government, one that is the
least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some indi-
vidual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it
when not exerted arbitrarily.").
138. Justice Holmes merely stated that the diminution in value "depends upon
particular facts." Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413. In Hage, the Court of Fed-
eral Claims points out that "[rlegulations, of course, can become so burdensome as to
effectively result in the equivalent of a direct, physical appropriation of a property
interest." 35 Fed. Cl. at 168; see also Marzulla & Marzulla, supra note 123, at 550
("[T]he Claims Court, almost alone among judicial tribunals in this country, has intu-
itively understood the importance of the ad hoc factual inquiry prescribed by the
Supreme Court for regulatory takings cases.").
139. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)
(establishing a takings analysis that begins with the categorical rule that a landown-
er is entitled to just compensation whenever a regulation deprives the landowner of
"all economically beneficial or productive use of [his] land."); United States v. River-
side Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985) (establishing a two-part test from the
Agins factors used to decide regulatory takings); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260-63 (1980) (establishing a three-part test to be used in regulatory takings
cases); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (establish-
ing the three-prong Penn Central test for regulatory takings, which includes the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation, the interference with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations, and the character of the governmental regulation).
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and-fill permit under the Clean Water Act 4° constituted a
compensatory taking of private property.' Before Loveladies
Harbor, the court had held that permit denials were merely
invalid, thus allowing the dredge-and-fill activity to occur. After
Loveladies Harbor, a private property owner subject to a taking
of private wetlands property may receive compensation, and the
dredge-and-fill activity may be prevented."" In either case, the
private property owner wins his or her takings claim, but only
in the second case does the public also benefit by the preven-
tion of wetlands deterioration. This change in the court's final
conclusion has been criticized as a change in judicial policy in
favor of private property owners in wetlands cases,' but the
change could be found to favor the environment as well.
The policy initiated by the Supreme Court and followed by
the Court of Federal Claims involving the "parcel as a whole"
issue is also court-created. In Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, the Supreme Court first discussed the "parcel
as a whole" concept and stated that the Court will not find a
taking where the government prevents a private property owner
from using only part of his property.' In other words, there
will be no taking if the private landowner still has use of a
significant portion of his or her property.4 ' This concept was
given new meaning, however, in Chief Judge Smith's opinion in
Loveladies Harbor. In Loveladies Harbor, the Court of Federal
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
141. See 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 153 (1990); see Kennedy, supra note 118, at 725 ("The
remedy in Loveladies Harbor, unlike any other previous case, required the govern-
ment to pay just compensation-specifically $2,658,000."); see also Florida Rock Indus.
v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990) (deciding on the same day as Loveladies Har-
bor that a permit denial under section 404 was a compensatory taking); 1902 Atlantic
Ltd. v, Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983) (holding for the first time that a
permit denial was a taking, although this particular permit denial was arbitrary and
capricious).
142. Actually, the Supreme Court held that a regulatory taking gives rise to a
Fifth Amendment guarantee of compensation three years before the Court of Federal
Claims held the same. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
143. See generally Kennedy, supra note 123.
144. 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66
(1979) (using the "bundle" of property rights analogy and stating that "the destruction
of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed
in its entirety."). The Andrus court also stated that "the denial of one traditional
property right does not always amount to a taking." Id. at 65.
145. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
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Claims stated that it was focusing on the "interference with the
rights in the parcel as whole,"" but defined that whole parcel
as only the 12.5 acres affected by the permit denial, instead of
the original 250 acres bought by the plaintiff or the fifty-one
acres currently owned by the plaintiff.47 The concept has been
addressed by other courts, including the Supreme Court in a
footnote to Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, in which
Justice Scalia discussed how to define the property interest
actually lost to a regulatory taking."* His dictum, however,
did not provide property owners with definite rules about their
property interests.'49
2. The Court as an Impetus to Policymaking
Some would argue that the examples above merely represent
judicial activism instead of policymaking decisions; however,
none can deny that the courts' decisions favoring private prop-
erty owners can have significant impacts on governmental
policymaking. 5 °  Glenn Sugameli of the National Wildlife
146. 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 391 (1988).
147. See id. at 393. The plaintiffs had originally bought 250 acres, but only 51
acres remained in their possession at the time of the alleged taking. Of these 51
acres, 38.5 were not considered by the court because they were not being considered
in the permit application at issue. See id. at 392-93.
148. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
Justice Scalia wrote:
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a
rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze
the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all econom-
ically beneficial use of the burdened property of the tract, or as one in
which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as
a whole. . . . The answer to this difficult decision may lie in how the
owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of
property....
Id.
149. See Sugameli, supra note 133, at 477-83 (discussing the Lucas statements and
that of other courts on this issue).
150. See Chief Judge Loren A. Smith, Foreword to 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 509, 511-
12 (1991) (describing the nature of the United States Court of Federal Claims and
the ramifications of its decisions, and stating that "[t]he interpretation of a contract
dispute, a tax statute, or an employment regulation may have profound effects on the
ability of the government to operate.") [hereinafter Foreword]; see also Marzulla &
Marzulla, supra note 123, at 549-50 (stating that the homogeneity of the claims court
"appears to have noticeably diminished the United States Supreme Court's interest in
reviewing Claims Court regulatory takings decisions, thereby underscoring the impor-
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Foundation, for example, asserts that a taking can have the
same practical effect of invalidating a regulation, which "can in
turn have far-reaching impacts on public policy, potentially
damaging the ability of government to regulate in areas of
important public interest such as health, safety and the envi-
ronment." 5' He also argues that takings litigation has been
used as a tool to influence government policymakers.'52
The federal government has responded to the courts' more
recent takings cases by changing some of its policies in order to
prevent regulatory takings. Some believe that the government
has thus fostered efforts to "thwart" environmental regulation
in general,'53 while others believe that the government has
merely acted "[in an effort to formulate a prospective remedy
for the ever-growing complexity of governmental regulations
and corresponding impositions on private property."" Presi-
dent Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,630, for example, has
support from the latter group.' This Order, issued in 1988,
directed government agencies and the Executive to consider
whether proposed policy or regulatory actions would give rise to
Fifth Amendment takings claims from affected property own-
ers.'56 One writer opposed to the Order states that it "re-
quire[s] that all federal regulations be approved.., under a
test that severely misrepresents Supreme Court precedent on
takings law."'57 Directly contrasting that view, a proponent of
tance of the decisions penned by Claims Court judges.").
151. Sugameli, supra note 133, at 441-42. Because of the potential impacts,
Sugameli asserts that
[bloth sides in the current debate on takings recognize the larger stakes
involved in every takings case. Pro-takings advocates are using takings
as a way to launch a back-door administrative, legislative and judicial at-
tack on the laws and regulations that they cannot modify or repeal on
the merits. In response, public interest advocates representing environ-
mental, labor, health, safety and other concerns are working on all three
takings fronts to protect these programs.
Id. at 442.
152. See id. at 451 ("Pro-takings activists have targeted litigation as an important
means of achieving their ends.").
153. See id. at 442-54.
154. Marzulla & Marzulla, supra note 123, at 566.
155. Governmental Action and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property
Rights, Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994).
156. See Marzulla & Marzulla, supra note 123, at 566-67.
157. Sugameli, supra note 133, at 443-44.
1996 1207
1208 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1183
the Order asserts that it "reflects thoughtful consideration and
vigorous debate throughout the affected government agencies,
and attempts to establish a practical and workable procedure
for implementing the holdings in Nollan and First English."58
Government attempts to comply with the Order have received
mixed reviews and efforts have been made to rescind the
Order.'59
In response to the takings confusion, 6 ' Republican congres-
sional candidates and members promised in 1992, as part of
their "Contract With America," to enact legislation creating a
statutory right to compensation for regulatory takings. 6' In
1995, the House and Senate considered bills directed at such
regulation, the former known as the "Private Property Protec-
tion Act of 1995," and the latter known as the "Omnibus Prop-
erty Rights Act of 1995. "162 Both bills are "primarily aimed at
158. Marzula & Marzulla, supra note 123, at 567.
159. See Sugameli, supra note 133, at 445. Sugameli tells us that 20 distinguished
academic experts have urged President Clinton to rescind the Order. In a letter to
the President signed April 2, 1993:
They concluded that the Order was "based on an erroneous, biased view
of the law . . . [and] represents a misguided effort to use the specter of
government liability under the Fifth Amendment in order to frustrate
regulatory activity that certain members of the Reagan Administration
opposed as a matter of policy."
Id. (quoting Letter from Bruce A. Ackerman et al., to the President of the United
States 1 (April 2, 1993)).
160. See Private Property Rights: Hearings on S. 605 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 605]
(testimony of Loren A. Smith, Chief Judge, United States Court of Federal Claims)
('[Nleither government nor citizen has much guidance as to what will or will not be
a taking."). In Bowles v. United States, Chief Judge Smith points out that takings
law is a difficult subject for both the federal government and the private citizen be-
cause there is little precedential guidance. 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 39 (1994). He also implies
that the political branches should act in this area:
There must be a better way to balance legitimate public goals with fun-
damental individual rights. Courts, however, cannot produce comprehen-
sive solutions .... Judicial decisions are far less sensitive to societal
problems than the law and policy made by the political branches of our
great constitutional system.
Id. at 40.
161. See Payson R. Peabody, Will the 104th Congress Revolutionize Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Law? An Analysis of the Private Property Protection Act of 1995, 5 FED.
CRcuIT BAR J. 199 (1995), available in WESTLAW, 5 FEDCBJ 199. One can probably
assume that those Republicans supporting the proposed measure would not agree
with Kennedy, supra note 123 at 3, who calls the court a "safe harbor" from govern-
mental regulation.
162. H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 605, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141
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direct regulation of traditional forms of private property," 163
and both attempt to clarify ambiguities created by the Supreme
Court's Penn Central test.'" For example, both bills establish
certain thresholds for mandatory compensation-property own-
ers would receive compensation whenever any portion of their
property has been diminished beyond the threshold amount.6 5
In addition, both bills direct reviewing courts to consider only
the part of the land affected by the regulation, not the property
as a whole.'66 One commentator remarks that these two provi-
sions, if passed, "are likely to result in larger and more fre-
quent awards of compensation than would occur under existing
Fifth Amendment law."'6 That may sound attractive to the
private property owner; however, this compensatory scheme
could lead to problems of non-payment by under-funded agen-
cies, since both bills require payment from the annual appro-
priation of the agency whose regulation caused the taking. 68
The two property rights bills, if passed, would create the first
statute to explicitly state that private property owners have a
right to compensation from the federal government under the
Fifth Amendment.'69 Although this is already stated in the
Fifth Amendment itself, the bills' proponents argue that the
congressional statute would "bring new vitality to Fifth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, and a new willingness on the part of feder-
al judges to enforce its guarantees in the context of federal and
state regulatory takings claims."'70 One can argue, however,
CONG. REC. S4492-01, S4497 (1995).
163. Peabody, supra note 161 at 203.
164. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For the three
prongs of the Penn Central test, see supra note 139.
165. See Peabody, supra note 161, at 203-05. The House bill sets the threshold at
20 percent, and the Senate bill sets it at 30 percent. See id. at 204. The House bill
also requires the government to buy the property at the owner's option if the regula-
tion diminishes its use by more than 50 percent. See id. at 203.
166. See id. at 204. But see id. at 219 ("Even here, however, federal courts will
most likely interpret the Bill's language as requiring an analysis of a parcel that is
larger than the affected piece alone because concentrating on the affected piece alone
would always yield a 100% diminution.").
167. Id at 205.
168. See id. at 203 n.24, 205. "Under existing law, payments for compensation are
made out of general government funds." Id. at 203 n.24.
169. See id. at 219-20.
170. Id. at 220. The reader may be interested to note that Payson Peabody was a
Judicial Intern to Chief Judge Loren A. Smith in 1994-1995.
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that it is the courts' more recent stance in regulatory takings
cases that has already given new vitality to Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence, which has in turn led to proposals such as those
contained in these two bills.
B. The Court's Role From Justice Stevens's Perspective
Whether one believes that the Court of Federal Claims actu-
ally makes policy or merely follows judicial precedent in formu-
lating equitable results may depend on one's own political inter-
ests. Judge Smith would certainly argue the latter. 7' Justice
Stevens would agree with Judge Smith's statement that the
courts are "bound by constitutional language and prece-
dent,"' but he would argue that the courts, including the
Court of Federal Claims and the Supreme Court, have acted
outside of those boundaries, with "far reaching" policy implica-
tions.'7
Justice Stevens contends that the Supreme Court has shown
an imprudent "lack of self-restraint" in deciding certain recent
takings cases.'74 In his dissent in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, for example, Justice
Stevens stated that the Supreme Court has "reached out to
address an issue not actually presented ... and has then an-
swered that self-imposed question in a superficial and ... dan-
gerous way."75 In First English, the Court created an addi-
tional takings policy by holding for the first time that a tempo-
rary taking of private property required just compensation. 7 '
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist supported his First English
opinion with judicial precedent,'77 Justice Stevens asserted
that "the Court distorts our precedents in the area of regulatory
171. See supra part IV.A.
172. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 151.
173. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 340 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 325.
175. Id. at 322.
176. See id. Although the ordinance which "took" the plaintiffs property was in-
validated, Justice Rehnquist states that "[i]nvalidation of the ordinance ... though
converting the taking into a 'temporary' one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the
demands of the Just Compensation Clause." Id. at 319.
177. See id. at 318-22.
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takings when it concludes that all ordinances which would
constitute takings if allowed to remain in effect permanently,
necessarily also constitute takings if they are in effect for only
a limited period of time."78 In addition, Justice Stevens sug-
gested that temporary takings should be a due process issue
rather than a regulatory takings issue.179 In conclusion, he
contended that "[t]he policy implications of [the First English]
decision are obvious and, I fear, far reaching .... Much impor-
tant regulation will never be enacted."80
In his dissent in Dolan v. City of Tigard, Justice Stevens also
spoke out against the Court's creation of another new takings
policy-the "rough proportionality" test-and the application of
that test in the Dolan case. 8' In Dolan, the Supreme Court
held, in a 5-4 decision, that the City of Tigard could not arbi-
trarily require a private landowner to dedicate a portion of her
property in exchange for a building permit or variance.'82
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that
the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine prohibits the govern-
ment from requiring a person to relinquish a constitutional
right "in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government where the property sought has little or no relation-
178. Id. at 322. Justice Stevens also asserted that "this Coures precedents demon-
strate that the type of regulatory program at issue here cannot constitute a taking."
Id. at 325.
179. See i&L at 339. He states that "it is the Due Process Clause rather than [the
regulatory taking doctrine] that protects the property owner from improperly moti-
vated, unfairly conducted, or unnecessarily protracted governmental decisionmaking."
Id.; see also Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 205 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment requires a State to employ fair procedures in the administration
and enforcement of all kinds of regulations.. . . [Als long as fair procedures are
followed, I do not believe there is any basis in the Constitution for characterizing the
inevitable by-product of every such dispute [with regulatory bodies] as a taking' of
private property.").
180. First English, 482 U.S. at 340. Justice Stevens strongly asserts that the Court
has acted improperly:
[Tihe loose cannon the Court fires today is not only unattached to the
Constitution, but iy also takes aim at a long line of precedents in the
regulatory takings area. It would be the better part of valor simply to
decide the case at hand instead of igniting, the kind of litigation explo-
sion that this decision will undoubtedly touch off.
I& at 341.
181. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396-411 (1994) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
182. See id. at 392-96.
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ship to the benefit."" In dissent, Justice Stevens contended
that "the application of the 'unconstitutional conditions' label to
a mutually beneficial transaction between a property owner and
a city" is a "judicial innovation" similar in stature to that of the
regulatory takings doctrine established by Justice Holmes."M
As for the newly created "rough proportionality" test," Jus-
tice Stevens asserted that the Court erected "a new constitu-
tional hurdle" despite the fact that "[n]ot one of the state cases
cited by the Court [for precedent] announces anything akin to a
'rough proportionality' requirement."8 '
C. The Development of Takings Policy in Light of Chief Judge
Smith's Statements in Hage
In regard to takings claims, Justice Stevens appears to be-
lieve strongly in the concept of judicial restraint.'87 Judicial
restraint, however, is not characteristic of takings policy devel-
opment. 8 Without the judicial activism of Justice Holmes,
regulatory takings might not exist today.'89 If courts always
ignored changes in governmental and societal policy when mak-
ing legal decisions regarding property use, zoning might be
considered unconstitutional.' Although courts will generally
183. Id. at 385.
184. See id. at 406-07. "[T]he Court's reliance on the 'unconstitutional conditions'
doctrine is assuredly novel, and arguably incoherent." Id. at 409. Justice Stevens also
states that "[o]ne can only hope that the Court's reliance today on First Amendment
cases .... and its candid disavowal of the term 'rational basis' to describe its new
standard of review, . . . do not signify a reassertion of the kind of superlegislative
power the Court exercised during the Lochner era." Id.
185. See id. at 391. Under this test, the city "must make some sort of individual-
ized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent
to the impact of the proposed development." Id.
186. Id. at 398.
187. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1061 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Proper application of the doctrine of judicial restraint would
avoid the premature adjudication of an important constitutional question.").
188. See supra part IV.A.1
189. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). "While the evi-
dence of original intent is limited, it clearly indicates that the Takings Clause was
intended to apply only to physical takings, and the early case law interpreted it and
its state counterparts as not extending to government regulations." Treanor, supra
note 137, at 783.
190. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). While upholding a zon-
ing ordinance that "would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive" at an earli-
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follow constitutional language and precedent as suggested by
Chief Judge Smith, 9' certain judges deciding regulatory tak-
ings cases have been known to glean new material from the
same precedent.9 2 While these judges would not state that
they are intentionally creating takings policy, new takings tests
constitute new policy.'93
In Bowles v. United States,'94 Chief Judge Smith stated that
"U]udicial decisions are far less sensitive to societal problems
than the law and policy made by the political branches of our
great constitutional system."'95 Two years later, in Hage v.
United States, Judge Smith went one step further and asserted
that judicial decisions are not at all sensitive to societal prob-
lems:
To conclude that policy making is the nature of the court's
role in taking cases, however, is to substitute a psychologi-
cal impression or an ideological bent for hard legal analysis
about property law and the Fifth Amendment. Taking cases
are only about one thing, whether the government action in
question takes private property without just compensation.
Taking cases are not about "the environment" or "endan-
gered species" or "wetlands." On these topics the courts
must defer to the President and Congress.'96
er date, Justice Sutherland stated that:
Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day,
for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which,
before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would
have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this
there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaran-
ties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract
to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming
within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible
that it should be otherwise.
Id at 387.
191. See Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 151.
192. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Loveladies Harbor, Inc.
v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988).
193. See supra notes 136-39, 144-49 and accompanying text.
194. 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (1994).
195. Id. at 40 (1994) (emphasis added). In Bowles, Judge Smith also stated that
the courts "can only interpret the rather precise language of the Fifth amendment to
our Constitution in very specific factual circumstances." Id.
196. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 151.
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Judge Smith also maintained that, not only does the court
decline to make policy based on societal concerns, but it also
does not factor in government policy when deciding a case. He
stated:
Finally, since the federal judge is not elected, as is the
President and the Congress, it would be highly presumptu-
ous of him or her in a democratic society to import into the
judicial analysis, views on the need or the lack thereof for
the government action challenged.197
The courts, however, are effecting and affecting takings policy
each time a new case is decided. If takings law had developed
strictly in line with Judge Smith's statements, regulatory tak-
ings would not be an issue and Judge Smith would not be de-
fending his decisions. 9 ' Moreover, strict compliance with
Judge Smith's statements conflicts with the statements of Jus-
tice Sutherland in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company. 9' While
holding for the first time that a zoning ordinance is a restric-
tion on the use of private property allowed under the Constitu-
tion, Justice Sutherland pointed out that new regulations of
private property will be allowed to develop under the growing
or contracting scope of various constitutional protections."'
Despite the fact that government policy should not affect a
court's decisions, Judge Smith does believe that "it is the
judge's duty to provide assistance to the Congress where the
court's experience can aid in making the administration of jus-
tice more fair and efficient."' Because takings cases can be
"expensive, unpredictable in their rules, and often not very just
in their results," Judge Smith provided his own expertise on
takings through testimony given to the Senate's Committee on
the Judiciary.0 2 In his testimony, however, he was certain to
clarify that "with respect to the policy goals of this legislation, I
and the court take no position as this is a matter within the
197. Id. at 152.
198. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
199. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
200. See id. at 387; supra note 190.
201. Hearings on S. 605, supra note 160 (testimony of Loren A. Smith, Chief
Judge, United States Court of Federal Claims).
202. Id.
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discretion of the political branches of our great constitutional
system."
20 3
D. Takings For The Public Good
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Court of Federal Claims decided
some significant takings cases in favor of the private property
owner. In Hage, the court may find yet another taking of pri-
vate property.2 Such generous decisions spark criticism from
supporters of environmental regulation, which is particularly
suspect in many takings cases.2 5 However, a court's finding
that a taking has occurred should not necessarily be viewed as
a win only for the private property owner with a concurrent
loss for the environment. Instead, it can be viewed as a win for
the public at large.2 6
Judge Smith pointed out that "[t]he purpose of the 'taking
clause' is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens, which, in all fairness and justice should be
borne by the public as a whole."'27 Furthermore, he empha-
sized that "[t]he Fifth Amendment requires that society as a
whole, rather than a particular property owner, bear the bur-
den of the exercise of state power in the public interest."
208
203. Id.
204. However, this author believes that the Hages do not have a very strong case.
205. See generally Ridgeway & St. Clair, supra note 9.
206. See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417-18 (1992)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (asserting that a regulation which prevents a public harm
should be allowed to stand, but a regulation which promotes a public good should be
considered a taking because the public should pay for a government action which pro-
vides benefits beyond what is necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of
the general public).
207. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 158 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960)). "The right to just compensation is as fundamental a right as the right to
vote and the right to free exercise of religion." Id. at 168.
208. Id at 167-68 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980)). In his dissent in Florida Rock
Indus. v. United States, Chief Judge Nies asserted that "[t]he more often the govern-
ment must pay for exercising control over private property, the less control there will
be. That is the reality. . . ." And, 'Toiwnership of property carries responsibilities to
the community as a whole as well as privileges." 18 F.3d 1560, 1575, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1994). Judge Smith acknowledges the tension between the coures "role as a guardian
of the public fisc and its role as a guardian of the individual's legal rights against
government conduct," but it seems likely that he would put the later first. Foreword,
supra note 150, at 511.
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His recent takings decisions have reflected this view by remedy-
ing situations "which, if left untouched, would have left the
property owner severely and adversely affected by the operation
of a government regulation.""°' Some would argue, however,
that the court's decisions in general may have, instead, 'lost
sight of Congress' intent in promulgating section 404" of the
Clean Water Act. 10 Whether one agrees with one view or the
other may hinge on one's gut feelings about environmental
protection, rather than on a serious consideration of the court's
role in takings litigation. But viewing certain takings as a pub-
lic benefit, in which the public pays for the benefit of environ-
mental protection, may make the court's recent holdings easier
to accept.
E. A Return to the Hage Case: Will New Policy Be Made?
Livestock grazing on public lands has received much more
attention in the last two decades as the federal government has
received more pressure from environmentalists to better protect
western environmental resources.21" ' Although BLM proponents
claim that they are successfully changing their practices in
favor of a cleaner environment, BLM critics continue to claim
that "the Bureau's managers still place the interests of livestock
operators above environmental values.""
Some believe that the western ranchers still have a great
deal of power over livestock grazing programs,2" while others
209. Marzulla & Marzulla, supra note 123, at 563. In Florida Rock, for example,
"the court appeared to have been influenced in part by the inequity of a situation
where property owners were 'singled out' to bear the burden of a regulation merely
because of the timing of the commencement of mining." Id. at 559.
210. Thomas Hanley, A Developer's Dream: The United States Claims Court's New
Analysis of Section 404 Takings Challenges, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 317, 320
(1991).
211. See Feller, supra note 7, at 556.
212. Id. at 556-57; see also id. at 586-99 (discussing two examples in which the
author believes that the BLM's "policies and practices lead to the subordination of
environmental values to livestock interests."); Ridgeway & St. Clair, supra note 9, at
13 ("Until now the federal managers of the public domain in the [BLM] and Forest
Service have, if anything, been accused of being too cozy with the ranchers, mining
companies, loggers and other business interests they superintended.").
213. See Ridgeway & St. Clair, supra note 9, at 14 ("The political power of the
Western rancher cannot be underestimated."). But see id. at 15-16 (pointing out that
Jim Nelson, the supervisor of the Toiyabe National Forest who has begun to crack
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such as Wayne Hage believe that ranchers are paying for the
fact that Americans have lost sight of the importance of private
property.214 Wayne Hage has already closed down his ranch,
but vhether he will be compensated for his loss remains open
for debate. Whether the judges of the Federal Court of Claims
agree with Hage's opinions, however, should not be important.
Judge Smith has already made it very clear that the court's
role is to "interpret the words of the constitutional protection,"
and certainly not to "import into the judicial analysis, views on
the need or the lack thereof for the governmental action
challenged."2
Based on the preliminary opinion and the precedent given in
support of the government's case, the court does not appear
poised to grant compensation in the Hage case, except perhaps
for the water used by the elk and the improvements made to
the land. The court acknowledged that the Hages have given
"creative" reasons and presented "novel" arguments for why
they should have a property right in federal lands;216 however,
those novel arguments are supported by neither case law nor
legislation. Moreover, the court stated that it "declines to create
such rights contrary to the clear legislative intention of Con-
gress."" The Hages could win on certain arguments only if
down on "renegade" ranchers like Wayne Hage, thinks that "the Wise Use movement
is really a front for right-wing political forces and multinational corporations.").
214. See Wayne Hage, Property Rights, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 5, 1995, available
in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 5804170. Hage quotes John Adams to support.his position on
the importance of private property: "The moment the idea is admitted into society
that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and there is not a force of law
and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence. Property must be
sacred or liberty cannot exist." Id. at 2. Hage also emphasizes that "[o]ur founders
knew that private property was the cornerstone of all civil liberties.... [In addition]
[tihe concept of property in America stemmed from the Lockean doctrine that the
individual is sovereign in his own right. Your life was your property, not the state's."
Id. at 2, 5.
215. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 151, 152.
216. See id. at 169-70, 174-75. Glenn P. Sugameli recognizes that creative and
novel arguments are not enough. He points out:
In the wake of Lucas, those who might be overly encouraged by publicity
surrounding this issue should be aware that courts have continued to
reject creative and premature takings claims. This includes the Court of
Federal Claims, which has been the subject of recent misguided commen-
tary identifying a pro-takings trend based upon three decisions of a sin-
J.e judge, all of which are under appeal.
Sugameli, supra note 133, at 502-03.
217. Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 170; see also Blank, supra note 20, at 612-22 (discussing
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the government changes its own policy, without the court's
input.
V. CONCLUSION
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes warned
that "[glovernment hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law.... [Slome values are
enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the po-
lice power."21 Holmes' opinion and his "goes too far" language
has sparked political debate and judicial growth in the takings
arena. Judicial tests used to determine whether a taking has
occurred have evolved in a manner leaving property owners
with no clear guidance. Regulations that would not have result-
ed in takings twenty years ago are now suspect.219 And prop-
erty owners afraid of environmental regulation have cried out
for protective legislation. Congressional legislation could quell
some of the confusion, but the courts would continue to play a
significant role in takings jurisprudence with their ever-chang-
ing interpretations of property rights and the parcels affected.
Therefore, takings policy is likely to continue to evolve with the
input of both the judiciary and the legislature.
Danielle M. Stager*
the acts passed and cases decided regarding the creation of water and grazing rights).
218. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
219. See Hanley, supra note 210, at 317-18.
* The author wishes to thank her parents, James and Diana Stager, for their
unending love and support.
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